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1 Introduction
Disability insurance programs are an important feature of modern economies. A sizable
proportion of the working age population is enrolled in public or mandatory disability
insurance schemes in all developed countries. One of the main aims of the schemes is to
provide income for persons who are for medical reasons not sufficiently able to generate
income through labour force participation. There is also an insurance element to most
programs, as the schemes do not only provide income, but income that is related to the pre-
disablement labour income, hence providing insurance against income loss due to disability.
The growth and magnitude of the disability insurance programs generate at least two
concerns. The first is that the programs strain public finances, see e.g. Autor and Duggan
(2006) for a discussion in the context of the US. The second main concern is that the
programs contribute to generating inefficiently low payoff to working and thereby waste of
resources by reducing labour supply below efficient levels. A prerequisite for even applying
for disability is usually withdrawal from the labour force, and similarly, a requirement for
receiving benefits may be limited participation in the labour market. The concerns are
interrelated. If the incentive effects of the programs lead to persons withdrawing from the
labour force, the programs are not only straining public finances, but at least in a first
best sense straining public finances unnecessarily.
In the last 50 year or so, the labour force participation of older men has decreased across
the developed economies. In the US, this feature can be explained by the introduction and
expansions of disability insurance programs, if one can have confidence in cross-sectional
regressions of individual disability insurance uptake on the replacement rate, see Parsons
(1980). These findings have been contested, see Haveman and Wolfe (1984), Bound (1989),
Parsons (1991) and Bound (1991), based on the argument that replacement rates are
endogenous. High replacement rates are associated with low incomes, and low income
individuals may be prone to become disabled for other reasons than high replacement rates.
Bound (1989) provided detailed information on the labour force participation of rejected
disability insurance applicants and argued that their participation should constitute an
upper bound on the labor force participation of those awarded benefits, in the absence of
the program. Clearly, also this approach is problematic, as rejected applicants are affected
by the disability insurance program. Recently, Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) provided
a substantial refinement of the control group approach in Bound (1989) by exploiting
administratively explicable discontinuities with respect to age in the rejection rates of
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disability applications. The international literature on the effects of disability benefits
on labour force participation or program participation is dominated by studies of the
programs in the US and Canada. However, the relationship between economic incentives
and disability has also been studied based on Norwegian micro data in Bratberg (1999).
While this study controls separately for potential labour income and disability, it suffers
from the same problem in principle as Parsons (1980), in that it is unclear whether the
variation in benefits or income is correlated with variables that may affect disability uptake
through other mechanisms. When potential benefits and income are functions of individual
characteristics, the effects of potential benefits and income can only be identified through
exclusion restrictions or imposed nonlinearities. A similar study is reported in Andreassen
and Kornstad (2006). Bowitz (1997), Rege, Telle, and Votruba (2005), Rege, Telle, and
Votruba (2007), and Holen (2007) also study disability benefits in Norway.
Finding exogeneous variation in the payoff to working, in the sense that the variables
generating the variation only affect the decision to work through the payoff, may indeed
be seen as the main problem in estimation of labour supply functions based on individual
data. Few attempts exist in the literature that try to solve this problem in the context of
disability pensions. Gruber (2000) uses different timing of increases in the benefit levels in
the region of Quebec and other regions in Canada. Hence, differences in time trends across
regions are exploited to estimate the effects of benefits at the individual level. A major
impact of the benefit levels is found, with an elasticity of labour force non-participation to
benefits of 0.3. While this may not sound like a high number, it translates into an elasticity
of program participation on benefits of about 1.5, assuming that benefit levels do not affect
non-participation except through program participation. The findings have been contested
by Campolieti (2004), who argues that the apparent effect found by Gruber is an artefact of
correlation between changes in benefit levels and changes in screening stringency. Bell and
Smith (2004) use a similar methodology to estimate effects of benefits on disability uptake
in Britain, by exploiting a reform of the benefit structure in 1995. They find more modest,
but still statistically significant, positive effects of benefit levels on program participation
and labour force non-participation.
The variation in benefits that is exploited in the current paper is due to an idiosyncracy
of the Norwegian National insurance scheme (NIS) disability pension scheme. Special rules
regarding the phasing in of the NIS imply that for a large subgroup of the population,
persons born in 1937 receive about 5 percent less disability pension than persons born in
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1940, with a gradual change between these birth cohorts. Which cohort a person belongs
to before 1937 or after 1940 is far less important. There is thus a rules-induced nonlinear
relationship between birth cohort and disability benefit level. It is thus possible to construct
a variable that only depends, and depends nonlinearly, on birth cohort, such that each
individual’s benefits is an individual specific increasing linear function of this variable.
Exploiting this variable as an instrument, it is possible to estimate the effects of benefits
on inflows to disability. I do this in a log-linear model of transitions to disability, where in
addition to the nonlinear cohort effects, age and year effects are controlled for. The specified
nonlinear relationship between birth cohort and benefits presupposes a consecutive earnings
history from age 27 until the medical event leading to disability. Since such consecutive
earnings histories are common for men and uncommen for women in the relevant birth
cohorts, I focus on men in the further analysis.
The explicit exclusion restriction applied here is that there are not, after controlling for
age and time variables in a flexible fashion, nonlinear birth cohort effects on transitions to
disability resulting from other mechanisms than the relationship between birth cohort and
benefit levels. The approach is related to the regression discontinuity approach, see e.g.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), in that the treatment (increasing benefit level) is related to
a ”continuous” variable that may also affect the response. The main difference from the
standard regression discontinuity setup is that our treatment is not a 0-1 variable, but a
continuous treatment size that varies nonlinearly with the cohort.
In addition to the NIS disability pension scheme, a large share of employees in Norway
are covered by occupational pension schemes that provide disability insurance. In the
relevant period, most occupational disability pension schemes in Norway in the relevant
period are defined-benefit schemes that cancel out the phasing in-effects of the NIS. Hence,
persons covered by such schemes should not be affected by the variable constructed. It is
thus in principle possible to construct a difference in difference estimator, where persons
eligible for occupational pensions are used as an explicit control group. However, there are
a few problems with such an approach. First, I do not know upfront who are eligible for
occupational pension schemes, though I am able to recover this information for those who
become disabled. Secondly, the coverage in occupational pension schemes is increasing
over the period studied (at least among those who become disabled), and the coverage
among the inflows of disabled also differ by age. Therefore, it is necessary in a difference-
in-difference approach to control for age and time effects separately for the treatment and
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control groups and it is necessary to assume that these effects are able to capture the
effects of changing sample selection over time. Since somewhat stronger assumptions are
necessary for the difference-in-difference variant of the estimator here, I prefer the original
instrumental variable estimator, while interpreting the estimation exercise for the control
group as a robustness test. However, these approaches are very close in spirit and the
qualitative results are in this case the same independent of the preferred approach.
A similar, but not identical, quality control exercise is done by partioning the sample
into those with and without a consecutive history of pension points (generated by labour
income or temporary benefits) from age 35 and up to the disabling event. I similarly
replicate the analysis for women, where few have consecutive earnings histories.
The main reason for studying inflows rather than stocks is large variations over time in
the inflows to disability. When studying flows it is possible to explicitly control for these
variations. The stocks, however, crucially depend on the history of such variations that
the persons in the stock have been exposed to, and controlling for the variations over time
in inflows is much more difficult.
2 Disability pensions in Norway
The Norwegian disability pension scheme is part of the public National insurance scheme
(NIS) that covers all residents in Norway. Anyone that for medical reasons is unable to
participate in the labour market for a substantial period of time is eligible for disability
pension. However, admittance into the scheme often takes a couple of years from the onset
of the medical event leading to disability. For a person that is employed at the time of
the onset of some health problem, sickness benefits is received for one year while staying
on as employed. From the termination of the employment relationship, rehabilitation
benefits are usually awarded for a period and a person can apply for disability pension.
Disability pensions are not supposed to be awarded before vocational rehabilitation has
been attempted, unless is it obvious that such rehabilitation will fail. Such vocational
rehabilitation programs are often of substantial duration. Even though the aggregate
disability pension uptake is clearly limited by the delay from the onset of a disabling
health event to entry into the program, the uptake is very high in Norway. More than 10
percent of the population in the age 18-66 years were on the disability pension rolls in the
start of 2004, the end of the period studied here.
Figure 1 shows the age-specific disability uptake rates for men in Norway in the start
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Figure 1: Age specific disability uptake rates. Men in Norway, 1992 and 2004
of 1992 and 2004, the endpoints of the data studied here. Clearly, disability benefits in
Norway is concentrated on the older part of the working age population, with extremely
high uptake closing in on the NIS pension age, which is 67 years. There are moderate
changes in the age structure, but not large increases or decreases in the overall age specific
disability uptake in the period. Aggregate disability uptake for men increased moderately
during this period, mostly due to ageing of the population. Disability benefits are also
heavily concentrated among the unskilled, measured as those without substantial schooling
beyond what is usually completed by age 16.
The corresponding age-specific inflows to disability are presented in Figure 2. Clearly,
there has been a large decrease in the inflow rates for the oldest groups due to the AFP
early pension scheme that was rolled out during this period, with lower age limit 62, see
Røed and Haugen (2003) for details. There has also been an increase in the inflows for
younger groups, more modest in absolute terms. The changes in inflow rates have not been
particularly smooth however, as seen from the times series of aggregate inflows in Figure
3. The changes in inflow rates are explained partly by a temporarily stringent screening
scheme for disability in the beginning of the 1990s, followed by reliberalisation later in
the 1990s and presumably also effects of changing capacity in the administration of the
benefits. There does not seem to be a close connection between the business cycle and
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Figure 2: Age specific annual inflow rates to disability. Men in Norway, 1992 and 2003
inflow rates to disability over time.
Individual disability pensions are calculated based on a rather complex scheme, de-
scribed in more detail in Appendix A. The income dependent part of the disability ben-
efits, the supplementary allowance, depends in a complex fashion on individual earnings
histories, which for disabled persons include computed future earnings until age 66. 40
years of sufficiently high annual earnings are required for full pension rights. No credit is
given for earnings prior to 1967. Hence, a person born in 1939 that enters the disability
pension program can at best have 39 years of sufficiently high earnings, from 1967 until
2005, the year he becomes 66 years. Persons from later birth cohorts can have 40 years
of sufficiently high earnings. Persons born in 1936 or earlier are covered by a rule that
states that the number of years of earnings should be compared not with 40 years, but
their number of potential years, which also covers the ages 67, 68, and 69, where no credit
is derived for disability pensioneers.
For the purposes of the following discussion, I will condition on individual earnings his-
tories. Exogeneity of individual earnings histories is however not a necessary assumption
in the further analysis. When becoming disabled, benefits are computed based on the earn-
ings history, transformed into a history of pension points at the NIS administration, with
the consequence that earnings are in practice corrected for average wage growth. When
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Figure 3: Inflow rate to disability for Norwegian men aged 18-66 years. 1992-2004
claiming that disability benefits depend on birth cohort, the counterfactual comparison
is with a person becoming disabled at the same age, but one year earlier, with the same
earnings history measured as earnings corrected for average wage growth. The main key
to the variation is that it is impossible to earn pension points before 1967. In addition it is
necessary to keep in mind that there is no gain from increasing the number of years with
pension points beyond 40, and to keep in mind the denominator in equation (1), which is
a strict function of birth cohort. Define Z as a function of birth cohort c by
Z(c) =
min(c− 1900, 40)
min(c− 1897, 40)
. (1)
A consecutive earnings history from age 27 until disablement is sufficient for Z(c) to de-
scribe the correct relationship between birth cohort and the supplementary allowance, in
the sense that individual benefits will be linear functions of Z(c), with both intercept and
slope being individual specific. The intercept is then the earnings history independent part
of the disability benefits and the slope is the supplementary allowance given full pension
rights. A person from the 1940 birth cohort or later cohorts does not need any pension
points from before age 27 to achieve full pension rights, as long as he has a consecutive
earnings history from age 27 until disablement. On the other hand, persons from birth
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cohorts 1939 and earlier could not earn any pension points before age 27.
For three reasons, the exposition above is too simple. First, there was a minor pension
reform in 1992, leaving years with pension points before 1992 more valuable than years
with pension points after 1992. Persons from later cohorts are less likely to have full set of
pension years before 1992. However, the effects of this reform are very small. Five pension
years missing before 1992 compensated by five years after 1992 leads to a reduction in the
income dependent allowance of less than one percent. Hence I disregard this effect in the
following.
Secondly, and importantly, many persons are covered by defined benefits occupational
disability insurance schemes. In such schemes, the annual benefits are typically guaranteed
to equal a certain proportion of the earnings at the time of the disabling event. The
insurance company, or government in the case of public occupational schemes, contributes
what is not already covered by the NIS scheme. The effect of the phasing in of the NIS
scheme is then neutralised for those who are covered by such schemes. In practice, all
public sector employees are covered by occupational disability insurance schemes. I do
not have information about the degree of coverage in the private sector. While I cannot
identify who are eligible for occupational pensions for the population at risk for disability,
I am able to identify whether those who become disabled receive occupational pensions.
Finally, not everyone has earned pension points continuously from 1967 and until a
disabling event. For persons with earnings histories deviating from this model, the rela-
tionship between birth cohort and benefits is not correctly described by Z(c). E.g. for a
person missing one year of pension points, but having an earnings history which could gen-
erate pension points at age 26, the relevant relationship is similar to Z(c), but increasing
in birth cohort until 1941. Each such nonlinear relationship should conceptually have been
included in the empirical model below. However, a majority of the persons in our sample
do in fact have consecutive earnings histories and each of the other nonlinear relationships
between birth cohort and benefits affect only a very small minority of the sample.
3 Data
The data used here are stocks and flows in disability in Norway, based on the Fd-trygd
database in Statistics Norway, covering the full data from the NIS, as well as demographic
and income-related data. The full counts of residents in Norway for the cohorts discussed
above is used, for the period 1992-2004. This gives good coverage for the most important
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period with respect to disablement for the birth cohorts around the crucial 1937-1940-
cohorts.
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Figure 4: Disability uptake rates, 1992-2004, for 58-, 59- and 60-year olds. The 1937 and 1940 birth
cohorts marked.
Figure 4 demonstrates why it is not a good idea simply to study the share of the
population that is disabled at a given age for the different birth cohorts, by plotting age
specific disability uptake for three relevant ages versus year. While the graph for the 60 year
olds seems consistent with a positive effect of Z(c), giving an increase in benefits uptake for
the years corresponding to the 1937-1940 birth cohorts, together with a general decreasing
trend, the other graphs do not. The reason for the noisy appearance of the stocks is the
short term variation in the inflows to disability seen in Figure 3 that contaminates the
stocks, leaving the graphs in Figure 4 incomparable at a fine level. E.g. all stocks are high
in the aftermath of the high inflow rates to disability in the late nineties. All stocks are
also high in the early nineties.
To be able to control for the fluctuations in inflows, I study transition rates to disability
with explicit year controls. Such transitions are studied over the years 1992-2004, with
eleven annual transitions. Further, I only study transitions to disability for the ages 52-60
(in the starting year). Older workers’ inflow rates would presumably be strongly affected
by the AFP early pension scheme, while the inflow rates among younger workers have also
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample 52 in ’92 52 in ’03 60 in ’92 60 in ’03
Number of persons 2589068 21592 29797 18604 24549
Share at risk 0.860 0.908 0.898 0.765 0.798
Subshare with CEH35a 0.841 0.867 0.833 0.851 0.832
Disability entrants 47301 212 340 544 697
Share of population 0.0183 0.0108 0.0127 0.0382 0.0355
Subshare with CEH35 0.740 0.750 0.682 0.814 0.773
Subshare with OPb 0.442 0.307 0.350 0.447 0.509
Subshare with CEH35, w/o OP 0.332 0.429 0.368 0.397 0.308
aConsecutive earnings history of at least 1 times the NIS basic amount from age 35 up to 5 years before current date.
bOccupational pensions exceeding 0.25 times the NIS basic amount, the year after inflow to disability.
changed quite a bit over this period. In addition, the 51-year olds in 1992 were from the
1941-cohort, hence there would be no variation in Z(c) for the 51 year olds. There is no
extra variation in Z(c) generated by including the last years of data in the analysis either,
as in 2003, persons from the 1943 to the 1951 birth cohorts are covered, so the inclusion of
the last years only contribute indirectly by increasing the efficiency of nuisance parameter
estimates. An important reform was implemented in 2004 creating a new disability benefit
program in Norway, so later data are not included. Since individual characteristics except
for age are not explicitly studied, the main dataset is essentially a year/age-matrix of
numbers of persons at risk and the number who transit to disability.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the full sample and the corners of our age/time
matrix of transitions. Those at risk for disability are those not already covered by dis-
ability benefits. From the second row in Table 1, it can be deduced that the share of the
population on disability rolls increases with age from about 10 percent for 52 year olds
to about 22 percent for 60 year olds, in consistency with Figure 1. The age structure in
disability is clearly changing over the period studied, with disability uptake increasing for
52 year olds and decreasing for 60 year olds. The subshare of the population at risk that
has a consecutive earnings history going back from 5 years before the risk for transition to
age 35 is about 85 percent. The consecutive earnings history back to age 35 is measured
because this can be done consistently for all birth cohorts. Years without pension points
in the last five years prior to receipt of disability pensions are not taken into account, as
such years are not likely to lead to lower pensions through Z(c) because they are likely
to be related to the disabling event. The share of the population at risk that transits to
disability is about 1 percent for the 52 year olds increasing to 3 percent for the 60 year
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olds. The subshare with a consecutive earnings history is somewhat lower among those
who transit to disability than for the full population at risk. The subshare of those who
transit to disability with occupational pensions is somewhat under half, increasing in age
and increasing over time. Whether a person qualifies for occupational pensions is mea-
sured through the income register the year after the transition to disability. Occupational
pensions beyond a certain minimum level, 0.25 times the NIS basic amount, are required to
be classified with occupational pensions. Very small amount of occupational pensions are
most likely not in practice defined benefits schemes that neutralize the effect of Z(c). The
subshare of those who transit to disability who has both a consecutive earnings history
and does not have occupational pensions is about one third. Persons outside this group
should not be affected by Z(c). Persons in this group should be affected by Z(c), except
for the incovenient but small group with a consecutive earnings history going back to age
35, but not back to age 27.
4 The model and empirical results
The actual process of applying for and being considered eligible for disability benefits is
rather messy, with requirements for being allowed to apply, processes for reapplication in
the case of rejection etc. Still, one may hope that the main process is captured in the
following simple conceptual framework: First, a negative health event occurs that makes
a person eventually eligible for disability pension and the person knows this. Secondly,
a person decides whether to take up the route leading to disability pensions. The choice
of whether to take up disability pensions, conditional on eligibility, is a classic economic
choice problem, depending on the utility if taking up disability pensions and the utility
if staying outside the program. In addition to any psychological costs of program par-
ticipation, the main cost of taking up disability is the limitation set to labour income or
labour activity. Whatever other factor may be important for the choice, the income as a
program participant and the income outside are plausible determinants of these utilities.
The ambition in this paper is to measure the effects of the size of the disability benefit on
this choice.
While it is not necessarily too difficult to set up a structural discrete choice model with
benefits and labour income (implicitly) entering the utility function in a random utility
framework, it is not clear how explicitly specifying such a model helps with the main
identification problem: How do we find variation in benefit level generated by variables
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that do not and are not correlated with unobserved variables that do affect disability
uptake through other mechanisms?
The approach taken here is to model the probability of becoming eligible for disability
pensions and taking up such pensions, and try to measure the effects of disability pension
on this probability. This is done within the framework of a log-linear probability model.
The reason for choosing this framework is that the model fits the data very well and that the
parameters are interpretable as elasticities. The constructed variable logZ(c) is used as an
instrumental variable to capture the effects of disability benefits. The essential assumption
is that there are not other important nonlinear birth cohort effects that generates any
apparent effect of logZ(c) on transition probabilities.
Our theoretical model is a binomial model with individual transition probabilities pi
for i = 1, . . . , n, given by
pi = exp(xiβi + ziγi), (2)
where xi are vectors of covariates, zi = logZ(ci), where ci is the birth cohort of individual i,
βi are vectors of individual specific nuisance parameters and γi are scalar individual specific
parameters of interest. The heterogeneity in parameters across individuals is important
in the following because logZ(c), by hypothesis, should affect some of the persons in the
sample but not others. The estimated model is of the form
pi = exp(xiβ + ziγ) (3)
However, when the pi’s are small numbers, as in this application, the maximum likelihood
estimate γˆ based on the misspecified model in equation (3) can be interpreted as an estimate
of the weighted average over individual γi, with weights proportional to pi, in addition to
the squared covariate values that constitute such weights in a linear model. To be precise,
let γˆ∗ denote the limit of γˆ as the number of observations goes to infinity. Now,
γˆ∗ ≈
∑
piz˜
2
i γi∑
pˆiz˜2i
, (4)
where pˆi are the estimated probabilities from the misspecified model and z˜i is zi cleansed
of variation that can be expressed as a linear function of other covariates in the precise
sense of
z˜i = zi − (
n∑
j=1
pˆjxjx
′
j)
−1(
n∑
j=1
pˆjxjz
′
j). (5)
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See Appendix B for a further discussion.
Our main parameter of interest is not the elasticity of transitions probabilities with
respect to Z(ci), but rather the elasticity with respect to benefit level, Bi, which I denote
. Assume that  is the same for everyone, so that the heterogeneity in the elasticity of
transition probabilities with respect to Z(c) is only due to differences in the elasticity of
Bi with respect to Z(c). Then
γi = 
∂ logBi
∂ logZ(ci)
(6)
Hence,
γˆ∗ ≈ 
∑n
i=1 piz˜
2
i
∂ log Bi
∂ log Z(c)∑n
i=1 pˆiz˜
2
i
, (7)
which can neatly be approximated by γˆ ≈ ν, where
ν =
m∑
i=1
z˜2ji
∂ logBi
∂ logZ(c)
/
m∑
i=1
z˜2ji , (8)
where j1, . . . , jm are the indices of those who transit to disability. Thus, ν can be approxi-
mated by a weighted average among those who become disabled, with weights based on the
squared cleansed covariates z˜2i . Thus, the estimate of the elasticity of interest is found by
ˆ ≈ γˆ/ν, where ν is possible to compute in our data.
In a more general setting, the elasticity of interest is also heterogeneous, and then
n−1
∑
i
wi
∂ log pi
∂ logBi
≈
γˆ
ν
, (9)
where
wi = piz˜
2
i
∂ logBi
∂ logZ(c)
/
∑
i
pˆiz˜
2
i
∂ logBi
∂ logZ(c)
. (10)
Hence, the estimate of the elasticity may be interpreted as a local average effect, weighted
both by the probability of transition to disability, the effect of the nonlinear cohort effect
Z(c) on benefits and on the squared cleansed covariates. Keeping this interpretation in
mind, I will in the following refer to this parameter as ”the elasticity”.
With the covariates used below, the difference between the approach taken here and a
simple approach studying the full transition probability to disability in the age range 52-60
years is that I (i) can control for the fact that different birth cohorts were faced with years
with different disability uptake probabilities, (ii) can use cohorts for which I do not have
data for all the transitions and (iii) can take into account smoothly changing age structure
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Table 2: Goodness of fit of different model specifications.
age cohort year year*agea Z(c) # paramb R2c AICd
model 1 lin. 2 0.9252 1342.6
model 2 free 9 0.9298 1318.0
model 3 free lin. 10 0.9357 1307.6
model 4 free free 28 0.9404 1291.1
model 5 free lin. 10 0.9357 1307.6
model 6 free free 20 0.9822 1002.9
model 7 free free lin. 21 0.9853 987.6
model 8 free free non-l. 28 0.9864 996.55
model 9 free free non-l. yes 29 0.9870 992.20
model 10 free free lin. yes 22 0.9859 983.26
model 11 free free yes 21 0.9828 1003.2
aNonlinear interaction effect between year and age should be interpreted as age-specific linear trends.
bThe relevant sample size is for comparison 117.
c
R
2 based on linear model approximation.
dAkaike’s information criterion based on exact model.
in the transitions to disability over time. Still, the reader may prudently worry that the
results obtained are sensitive to the exact model specification. Indeed, since any such
model is at best only an approximation to the real underlying process, one may worry that
the nonlinear cohort effects reflect model misspecifications rather than changing benefit
levels. The first reply to this objection is to demonstrate that the model fits the data very
well.
Table 2 provides evidence of the model fit and how it is affected by the inclusion
of various variables. Model fits are assessed by making a linear model approximation,
simply using the log transition rate for each cell as dependent variable. The basis for this
approximation is the standard Gaussian approximation to the binomial, dating back to de
Moivre. The linear model approximation is only used for generating the R2-numbers in
Table 2.
Most of the variance in the age/year - cell specific log transition rates can be explained
by age. The log transition rate is close to linear in age, though a free specification, with a
separate parameter for each age, improves the model fit (enough to be clearly statistically
significant at standard levels). This is the right point to study cohort trends because cohort
trends will later be picked up by the year effects. Including a linear cohort trend improves
the fit of the model and gives a weak positive trend over time. Including cohort specific
fixed effects improves the model further. However, the fit of the model is much better
if there are year specific fixed effects in the model, even though there are only 11 years
compared to 19 cohorts. Model 5 with linear year effects is equivalent to model 3 with
16
Table 3: Point estimates from Models 9 and 10 of the parameter associated with Z(c). Full sample
and partitioned samples
Sample Model parameter estimate standard error
Full sample 9 1.031 0.409
Full sample 10 1.006 0.400
Consecutive earnings 35+ 9 1.125 0.472
Consecutive earnings 35+ 10 1.090 0.460
Not consecutive earnings 9 0.348 0.822
Not consecutive earnings 10 0.386 0.811
No occupational pensions 9 2.100 0.566
No occupational pensions 10 2.083 0.552
Occupational pensions 9 -0.246 0.622
Occupational pensions 10 -0.310 0.630
Both restrictions 9 2.367 0.702
Both restrictions 10 2.322 0.681
Women 9 0.099 0.395
Women 10 0.003 0.390
linear cohort effects. The reason for the improvement when taking into account year effects
compared to cohort effects is that the year effects are highly nonlinear, starting out rather
low, increasing to a top around 1999 and then decreasing again, as seen in Figure 3. In
fact, after controlling for year effects, very little of the original variability is left. However,
the model can and should still be improved by introducing an interaction term between
age and year. Free age specific linear year trends do not give a substantial improvement
over a simple linear interaction term, though results for both specifications are reported
in the following, as the model with more parameters is most likely more robust. Including
logZ(c) gives a statistically significant improvement of the model at the 0.05 level. The
p-values based on likelihood ratio tests, computable from the reported AIC-values, are
0.007 for both model 9 and model 10, compared to model 8 and model 7, respectively.
The weighted average elasticity of benefits with respect to logZ(c), ν from equation (8),
is in our data computed to 0.23. The computation is based on the share of the individual
benefits received that are supplementary allowances. In addition, at the individual level,
the elasticity of benefits to logZ(c) is set to zero if the person in question is registered
with occupational pensions or without a consecutive earnings history. The weights in
the weighted average differ substantially across age-year cells. However, the within-cell
averages of the measured elasticity do not differ much across cells. The unweighted average
is about 0.22.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 3. The point estimates for the elasticity
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of transitions to disability with respect to Z(c) of about 1 together with the computed value
of ν imply that the point estimate of the elasticity of transitions to disability on benefits
levels is about 4.5. This is at face value a quite high elasticity. It is measured with
considerable uncertainty as seen from the standard error in Table 3. The lower limit of a
95 percent (Wald) confidence interval is slightly above 1, which is still reasonably high.
The critical reader will still worry that the nonlinear cohort effects through logZ(c)
picks up something else than changes in disability benefits. The second answer is to
provide robustness tests that corroborate the hypothesis that the nonlinear cohort effects
indeed mainly pick up the effects of changing benefit levels.
The first robustness test is to estimate the model separately for two partitions of the
sample, with the partioning based on whether the individuals have consecutive earnings
histories back to age 35, the strictest I am able to measure consistently for all cohorts.
The estimates based on the restricted sample without those missing a consecutive earnings
history should on one hand give better estimates than the original ones, because a number
of persons who could potentially have nonlinear effects of cohort that differs from Z(c)
are left out. On the other hand, using selected samples naturally introduces selection
problems. It is clear from Table 1 that the proportion, both of the population at risk and
among those who transit to disability, is changing over time. Such selection problems can
be expected to be of two variants. First, as indicated, the proportions change over time,
which probably means that the distributions of transition probabilites within each sample
partition changes over time. Secondly, even if the proportion had been constant, different
types of persons could be expected to satisfy the sample selection criteria, conditional
on cohort. As should be clear from the main identifying mechanism in this paper, the
incentives to secure a consecutive earnings history are cohort dependent. Still, assuming
that these effects are small or can be captured by the linear cohort trend in our models,
the effect of Z(c) on the selected sample should be stronger and the effect of Z(c) on those
sorted out should be about zero. As is seen from rows 3-6 in Table 3, the effect of Z(c)
increases somewhat when the sample is limited to only those with a consecutive earnings
history. Importantly, a small and statistically insignificant estimate of the effect of Z(c) is
associated with those without a consecutive earnings history.
In addition, I do a similar, but not identical, robustness test based on those who qual-
ify for occupational pensions. Note first that this sample selection would create similar
problems as above. However, in addition, I do not know upfront the proportion in the
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population at risk who qualify for occupational pension, only the proportion who qualify
for occupational pension among those who become disabled. It is still possible to estimate
separate models based on the numbers transiting to disability with occupational pensions
and those who transit to disability without occupational pensions. The same population
at risk can be used for both these estimation exercises. There are two points to make
about this. First, the likelihood of the binomial distribution is about the same for events
with small probability, independent of whether the population at risk is changed. More
precisely, halving the population at risk size and doubling the transition probability leaves
the likelihood more or less unchanged. Thus, in the absence of changing proportions with
occupational pensions and sample selection problems, not knowing which part of the pop-
ulation is at risk for which type of transition is not problematic. However, the proportions
do change over time. If, however, the controls are able to pick up the changing effective
numbers at risk given sample partition, as above, the effects of Z(c) on the transitions to
disability without occupational pensions should be stronger than the original estimate and
the effects of Z(c) on the transitions to disability with occupational pensions should be
zero. From Table 3, the effect of Z(c) increases strongly when only transitions to disabil-
ity without occupational pensions are studied. There is a small negative and statistically
insignicant effect of Z(c) on transitions to disability with occupational pensions. When
both restrictions are imposed the effect of Z(c) is even stronger. There are no appreciable
differences between Model 9 and Model 10.
The observant reader will now notice that it is possible to compute a difference-in-
difference estimator, with those with occupational pensions as a control group and the
doubly restricted sample as a treatment group. I argued above that I prefer the instru-
mental variable estimator above to the difference-in-difference version, because the latter
involves stronger assumptions related to the ability of the controls to capture the effects
of sample selection. However, for the reader who disagrees, the other estimate is supplied.
The relevant difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of logZ(c) is then 2.6 for model
9, with a standard error of 0.94. When this is translated into the elasticity with respect to
benefits, the point estimate is about 3.8. (The ν in this computation is based only on those
in the restricted sample.) The fact that the estimation results are qualitatively the same
should not be seen as independent verification of the robustness because the estimates
are based on essentially the same information. The estimates would differ if the effect of
logZ(c) on the control group was substantially different from zero.
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The third robustness test is to replicate the analysis with women rather than men.
Very few women in these age groups have the consecutive earnings history required to
make Z(c) matter. The relevant share of the disabled women with a consecutive earnings
history back to age 35 and without occupational pensions is 11,7 percent. However, even
this small number overestimates the share that would be affected by Z(c) because most of
these women are from birth cohorts after 1940. The hypothesis is then that the effect of
Z(c) on women should be close to zero, which it indeed is.
Why have I left out standard explanatory variables such as education, work experience
etc? If we believe that there is an initial distribution that is determined at an early stage
(early childhood) that has an impact on later probabilities of health shocks, this variable is
most likely interrelated with later achievements such as education, family situation, work
experience etc. Hence, if e.g. there is a strong relationship between educational level and
propensity to become disabled within a cohort, we should not necessarily conclude that
there should be changing propensity to become disabled due to changing education levels,
because there will be an element of sorting. The same argument would apply to more
or less any explanatory variable except gender and age. This is not a general argument
for why I could not have included individual covariates as controls in the model - it is
an argument for why uncorrected cohort effects may be as good as cohort effects with
individual characteristics netted out. Leaving individual characteristics out of the analysis
also allows for a stronger focus on the goodness of fit of the model as a model predicting
disability across age, time and cohort.
5 Concluding discussion
The present paper demonstrates that transitions to disability for men in their fifties are
increasing in benefit levels. The point estimates indicate very strong effects, but these
should be interpreted with caution, as the confidence intervals also include more moderate
values.
Taking point estimates at face value, however, the effects are much stronger than similar
estimates based on data from Canada or the UK. I have two hypotheses for why elasticities
should be higher in Norway than in most other countries. First, there should be a negative
relationship between the stringency of the requirements for receiving disability function and
the elasticity with respect to benefit levels. The ”marginal” disability pensioneer (with
respect to stringency of requirement) should be more responsive to economic incentives
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than the average disability pensioneer because the pool of pensioneers include a substantial
number of persons that are so disabled that they are in practice not able to work. Relatively
high disability uptake in Norway, not least for the age group studied here, indicates that
the requirements for receiving disability benefits are not particularly stringent, compared
to programs in other countries.
Secondly, it is not clear that the elasticity with respect to the benefits or the elasticity
with respect to the replacement rates are the best parameterization of such effects. Indeed,
basic economic theory would suggest that employment drops to zero for those who qualify
for the programs as the replacement rate goes to one. Thus, one should expect high
elasticities with respect to benefit level for countries with high replacement rates. Norway is
characterized by very high replacement rates, not least net replacement rates for disability
pensioneers, who often earn small supplementary allowances. Net replacement rates are
about 60 to 70 percent for the typical pensioneer studied here. Thus, a 1 percent change
in benefits will lead to a change in the difference between net income inside and outside
the program of about 2 percent.
The results provided here are of policy relevance for at least two reasons. First, they
show that there are important incentive problems associated with the disability pension
program. If the disability benefits had been lower, more persons would have stayed out
of the program, plausibly to participate in the labour market instead. Hence, there is
a substantial element of choice in the transitions to disability pensions. In boldface, the
results provided here are a strong indication that the disability pension program in Norway
constitutes a large scale waste of resources through subsidising voluntary early withdrawal
from the labor force. This is quite likely at odds with the aims of the program. Secondly,
substantial effects of benefits on transitions to probability mean that increases or decreases
in benefits will have important effects on the fiscal costs of benefit programs not only
directly, but also indirectly, through affecting behaviour. This is of current policy relevance,
as the benefits for the disabled are about to be revamped as part of a larger reform of the
Norwegian pension system.
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A Calculation of disability benefits in Norway
The disability pension scheme is tightly integrated into the old age pension scheme. The
old age pension consists of a basic allowance and a supplementary allowance. If this sum
does not exceed a small limit, the sum of the basic allowance and a special supplement is
granted instead (the minimum pension). The basic allowance depends on whether a person
is single or married and the number of years of residence in Norway, but not on previous
earnings. The supplementary allowance depends on the earnings history. In addition to
these allowances, there are special allowances for persons with dependents.
The ”currency” in the NIS pension system is G, the ”basic amount”. A low wage annual
income is about 4 G. G is adjusted somewhat ad hoc, but still more or less in line with the
average wage growth in Norway. Since 1967, a person has been awarded annual pension
points for earnings in excess of 1 G. When the old age pension is calculated, a persons full
pension point history is taken into account. It is possible to earn pension points up to age
69. The supplementary allowance measured in G can be described as the product of three
factors.
The first factor depends on the number of years of non-zero pension points. For younger
cohorts, this factor equals the ratio of the number of years on non-zero pension points to
40 years, with no credit for years in excess of 40. For older birth cohorts, the number
of years of non-zero pension points is compared with the maximum possible number of
pension points years, equal to the number of years from 1967 until and including the year
they became 69 years old, rather than with 40 years.
The second factor is the average of the best 20 years of pension points, or the average of
all years with nonzero pension points if there are fewer than 20 years of non-zero pension
points.
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The third factor is 0.45 times the proportion of pension points before 1992 and 0.42
times the proportion of years of pension points from 1992 onwards. Only 40 years are
taken into account, with excess years shaved off the number of years after 1992.
When a person is granted disability pension, a date is set for the disabling event. This
will typically be the date when the person started receiving sickness benefits, but could
also be set earlier than this. The future computed earnings can then be generated. This
is the best of the average of the three years immediately prior to the year including the
disabling event and the average of the best half of the years with non-zero pension points.
A person is then granted future earnings (in G) equal to the future computed earnings
every year up to and including the year the person becomes 66 years. If a person does not
earn more pension points, the disability pensions will then be constant until retirement
age and then be replaced by old age pensions with exactly the same benefit level.
B The theory of loglinear probability models with hetero-
geneous coefficients
This appendix describes some properties of the loglinear probability model in the interest-
ing case where the parameters of the model vary within the population studied, while the
estimated model is specified with homogeneous parameters.
The loglinear probability model can be expressed as a binomial model where the prob-
ability pi depends on xi through the equation
pi = exp(xiβ). (11)
The loglinear probability model is deficient in the sense that it can generate probabili-
ties that exceed 1. This is not a relevant problem when we study limits as probabili-
ties go to zero. Indeed, the results presented here hold for the complementary log-log
probability model (pi = 1 − exp(exp(xiβ))) and for the logit probability model (pi =
exp(xiβ)/(1+ exp(xiβ))). Both these models approximate the loglinear probability model
when probabilities go to zero, that is, when xiβ → −∞.
The log-likelihood function of the loglinear probability model is
l(β) =
∑
i
(yixiβ + (1− yi) log(1− exp(xiβ))), (12)
24
where yi takes on the value 1 upon success, 0 otherwise. The score function is
S(β) = ∂l/∂β =
∑
i
yi − exp(xiβ)
1− exp(xiβ)
xi, (13)
and the Fisher information matrix is
I(β) =
∂2l(β)
∂β2
=
∑
i
(yi − 1) exp(xiβ)
(1− exp(xiβ))2
xix
′
i, (14)
Assume that yi results from a different model, where β are individual specific βi, thus
the true model is characterized by pi = exp(xiβi). We will now see how the maximum
likelihood estimate of β depends on the individual βi. Such changes affect the likelihood
trough yi.
Substitute exp(xiβi) for yi in the score function. This is only sensible in a large sample
setting. As a very strict variant, there are only a finite number of values of xiβi and each
of these occur infinitely often as n→∞. The expected score function is now
E(S(β)) =
∑
i
exp(xiβi)− exp(xiβ)
1− exp(xiβ)
xi, (15)
The limit of the ML estimate βˆ is implicitly found by E(S(βˆ)) converging to zero as
n→∞.
Hence, the effect of βi on the (limit of the) ML estimate βˆ can be found through
differentiation as
∂βˆ
∂β1
= −(I(β))−1
∂E(S(β))
∂β1
(16)
with
∂E(S(β))
∂β1
=
expxiβ
1− exp(xiβ)
x1x
′
1, (17)
Thus, as exp(xiβi) goes to zero for all i, (formally e.g. by letting all xiβi contain a common
intercept term that goes to −∞,)
∂βˆ
∂β1
= −(
∑
i
pˆixix
′
i)
−1p1x1x
′
1 (18)
In a linear, as opposed to loglinear, probability model, as in other types of linear model,
the least squares estimate can be expressed as weighted average of individual coefficients,
where the weights are squared covariates, as in the equation above. However, in the case of
the loglinear probability model, the choice probabilities also enter the weights. In addition,
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of course, the ML estimate is not a weighted average. However, if we write βˆ, approximated
as a linear function of βi, the coefficients will sum up to approximately one, if pi and pˆi
do not differ too much.
Based on equation (18), it seems reasonable to assume that the limit of the maxi-
mum likelihood of the estimated β will approximate a probability weighted average over
individual βi, as long as the distribution of the covariates is independent of βi.
Sometimes, it may be necessary to take into account a systematic relationship between
covariates and βi. This is the case in this paper, where the distribution of the elasticity of
Bi on Z(ci) must be expected to vary with ci.
It is necessary to be careful when interpreting the contribution of xi to the weights in
the multivariate case. The formula includes the inverse of the (misspecified) probability
weighted covariance matrix of X, the matrix of stacked individual covariates. The effect
of one scalar parameter in the process generating the data on one scalar parameter in
the (limit of the) ML estimate is a linear product. Our focus is on a scalar parameter
of interest. It is possible to derive the relationship between the distribution of the true
parameter of interest and the scalar estimate of the parameter of interest, through linear
operations on the matrix X.
1. Compute pˆi from the estimated loglinear probability model.
2. Estimate the weighted least squares regression, with pˆi as weights, of the variables
associated with the nuisance parameters on the variable associated with the parameter
of interest.
3. Substitute the residuals from this analysis for the variable associated with the param-
eter of interest in the vectors xi.
Clearly, a reanalysis with the new covariate vector will give exactly the same estimate
of the parameter of interest, although the nuisance parameters will change. The matrix
∑
i pˆixix
′
i now have zero entries on the off-diagonal elements in the row and column asso-
ciated with the parameter of interest. The same holds true when the matrix is inverted.
Hence, the weights in equation (18) can be interpreted as in the case of scalar parame-
ters, as long as the variable associated with the parameter of interest is first ”cleansed” of
variation that can be expressed as a linear combination of the control variables.
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